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Financial Aggregation of Risks for SMEs in developing economies: A 
Conceptual Framework of Financial Aggregation and Microinsurance 
Effects 
Abstract 
Business vulnerability is a function of the extent of risks faced and the ability of the 
business to adapt to adverse changes in circumstances. Financial Aggregation arises out of 
the link between economic interactions at the micro level and their macro based risks 
Microbusinesses in developing countries are often highly vulnerable to a range of risks 
including natural disasters, corruption, poor weather conditions and illness. This vulnerability 
creates a need for insurance but ability to take out appropriate insurance is frequently limited 
by financial resources, availability of insurance policies and information on these policies and 
financial education levels. On the supply side, microinsurers are faced with high marketing 
and administrative costs and the microinsurance market is further distorted by information 
asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazards. This limits interest in the microinsurance 
market from commercial providers, with microinsurance frequently being available through 
non-profit agents. This paper investigates the relationship between vulnerability, risk appetite 
of microbusinesses and their propensity to insure. In building a conceptual framework, we 
explore the factors that impact financial aggregation and the uptake of microinsurance. We 
observe additionally that improved financial education and more effective information may 
help to increase the extent and quality of microinsurance. 
Keywords: Financial Aggregation, Microinsurance, Microbusiness, Risk, Risk Appetite, 
Business Vulnerability;  
 
  
Introduction 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are immensely vulnerable to 
economic, environmental and socio/political risks. However these risks do not in the ordinary 
course of events arise singly but are the results of events which may happen simultaneously 
and losses from these events may thus become aggregated. Aggregation of risks arises out of 
the economic interactions between risks at the enterprise and local (micro) level and wider 
national and international (macro) risks. The micro risks arise from the day to day business 
risks of the individual economic agents. The macro risks are possible events in the wider 
world and wider economy. Aggregation of risks can arise from any combination of risks, 
whether micro or macro. For instance, adverse events arising from government tax policies 
and interest rates and new regulations (all macro risks) may coincide with local or family 
events such as local weather changes or illness (which are micro risks). These events need not 
arise one at a time but can accumulate within a short timespan. Some risks, such as natural 
catastrophes, are uncontrollable and unpredictable. 
Munich Re Economic Research (2013) report that ‘The average percentage of direct 
losses per year with respect to GDP is highest in emerging economies at 2.9%, compared 
with developing economies (1.3%) and industrialized countries (0.8%,)’. 
To a greater extent MSMEs can handle some of micro and macro level risks through 
both formal and informal means. It is the uncontrollable uncertainties that can wipe out the 
whole livelihood of these MSMEs. Small businesses are not immune to risks arising from 
geographical shocks (O’Brien et al 2006; Srivastava and Shaw 2014; Joyette, Nurse and 
Pulwarty 2015). Floods, tsunamis, earthquakes and the like can be devastating to micro and 
small scale businesses. These enterprises’ own level of financial vulnerability adds to the 
level of aggregated risk. Moreover, MSMEs in these highly exposed developing countries are 
not always in a position to raise sufficient capital to reinstate damaged assets and restore 
enterprises post-disaster (Gurenko 2004). 
In addition to the risk of natural disasters there is also a considerable risk of manmade 
disasters affecting smaller enterprises. Small businesses in developing countries may be at a 
higher risk from corporate crimes involving non-compliance with building codes and health 
and safety violations by other businesses with which they share buildings (Ibem 2011; Rafi, 
Wasiuddin and Siddiqui 2012). 
The emergence of new financial instruments and risk mitigation schemes such as 
insurance risk transfer to global financial markets have motivated many developing country 
governments and institutions to consider these instruments for MSMEs to mitigate financial 
loss and financial aggregation as part of the disaster risk management process (Linnerooth-
Bayer et al 2009). 
Insurance enables the transfer of risks to an insurance organization or to a mutually 
constituted insurance pool. However for insurance to be available the insured party pays a 
premium and underwrites a small proportion of the loss (the latter to prevent moral hazard) 
for a certain amount of cover. Insurers will, however, only cover pure risks and not 
speculative risks. Uncontrollable risks like earthquakes, floods etc. are deemed fundamental 
risks which in theory are not insurable. However with capacity available worldwide, today 
many of the fundamental risks are covered. 
Small businesses reliant on local markets may also be vulnerable to local economic 
risks, which are not generally insurable. Nevertheless insurance demands a premium to be 
paid for the risk cover and this can be a problem for micro and small business enterprises, 
who may not have a consistent month on month income. These businesses can find 
themselves reverting to informal, high interest loans or selling their assets or engaging in low 
risk and potentially low output activities (Varangis et al 2002). 
The growth of microinsurance has proved a novel scheme to reach out to this sector to 
ensure cover is available to the most vulnerable at affordable prices (Mechler, Linnerooth-
Bayer and Peppiatt 2006; Apostolakis, van Dijk and Drakos 2015). There are microinsurance 
models in place (Cohen and McCord, 2003), including the use of mobile technology to pay 
premiums and to collect benefits. 
The provision of microinsurance does not necessarily alleviate financial risk 
aggregation. Firstly, many of the micro businesses may find it difficult to save to pay even a 
basic premium and the level of cover may be low at best. Secondly, in many instances there 
is financial exclusion preventing certain entrepreneurs from accessing banking facilities to 
enable investments and savings. The accelerating development of mobile technology 
seemingly plays a significant role in mitigating this circumstance (Prashad, Saunders and 
Dalal 2013; Prashad et al 2014). 
Our study seeks to inquire whether microinsurance through the various modes 
impacts the level of financial risk aggregation. The microfinance literature in the main and 
the microinsurance literature specifically has discussed the limitations of small businesses 
arising from the extent of their productive assets (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussis 2009), risk 
bearing capacity (Kondo 2007) and financial capability (Zeller and Meyer 2002; Rutherford 
1999; Churchill 2007). 
Vulnerability literature on SMEs has explicitly considered the relationship between 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity (Fiksel, 2003; Dalziell and McManus, 2004; 
Kitching et al 2009), yet there is still a need for further investigation of the relationship 
between perceptions of hazard and vulnerability. Low income groups, including many 
owners of microbusinesses are vulnerable to fundamental personal risks arising from poverty 
and illness (Bhattamishra and Barrett 2010; Cohen and Sebstad 2005; Dercon, Bold and 
Calvo 2008). This creates a vulnerability of a quality not faced by most large businesses, the 
survival of which is not usually bound up with the personal wellbeing of the owners. 
There have been some studies that show that vulnerability combined with a specific 
risk appetite impacts the propensity to insure (Reynolds et al 2001; Cohen, McCord and 
Sebstad 2005). 
Therefore we develop two contributions: the first is a conceptual paradigm for the 
analysis of the relationship between vulnerability and risk appetite among microbusiness 
owners, their perceptions of insurance and propensity to insure. The second is an examination 
of these relationships in the light of the existing literature on risk, microbusiness and 
microinsurance. 
The concept of financial aggregation of risk can, in principle, provide the theoretical 
base for a more in-depth analysis of risks and risk management for MSMEs in developing 
economies. We do not intend to provide a totally developed theory of financial aggregation of 
risk but we introduce a conceptual framework that intends to enable further discussion and 
testing of the relationship between risk, vulnerability and insurance in microbusinesses.  
In summary, in this study, we develop a conceptual model to explain the complex 
relationship between risk appetite, business vulnerability and insurance take up (propensity to 
insure) and its impact on financial risk aggregation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we present a framework for 
the discussion of microinsurance. Then the nature of risk and the variables by which risk may 
be described and categorized. We then discuss the factors affecting risk appetite, risk 
aversion and propensity to insure. 
We follow this by exploring the nature and development of financial risk aggregation 
and microinsurance. Finally we discuss the study’s conceptual contributions in order to form 
conclusions, identify the study’s limitations and suggest avenues for future research. 
Microinsurance: Probability of Utilisation 
The framework for our discussion of the uptake of microinsurance is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In order to predict the probability of utilisation of microinsurance, it is necessary to 
understand the potential policyholder’s exposure to risk and their attitudes towards risk and 
insurance. It is also, however, necessary to understand the factors affecting the probability of 
microinsurance being offered. The combination of these factors determines the probability of 
insurance contracts being taken up. 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Microinsurance 
________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 year here 
_________________________ 
As shown in Figure 1, the propensity to insure is a function of both the potential 
supply and the potential demand. The potential supply of microinsurance can be described in 
terms of the availability of insurance policies and their perceived quality, in terms of cost 
efficiency, appropriateness to the risks faced and speed and accuracy of processing claims 
(Matul, Tatin-Jaleran and Kelly 2011). 
Risk, Risk Attitude and Risk Appetite 
The demand side depends on the business owner’s attitudes to risk and the risks 
actually faced. Three separate but interlinked factors (see Figure 1) which need to be 
considered are risk, risk attitude and risk appetite. Risk is the level of probability of a variety 
of adverse events. Risk attitude is the personal attitude of the business owner towards risk in 
general, prior to consideration of the risks actually faced. Different business owners will have 
different risk attitudes in the same circumstances, with some being highly risk averse and 
some being willing to accept a high level of risk. Risk attitudes may be affected by a number 
of factors, including innate psychological disposition, potential domestic consequences of 
risk and education. Education may result in a more risk averse attitude to common events 
with extreme consequences (Izadkhah and Hosseini 2005) and a more relaxed attitude 
towards risks which are more remote or of less consequence, although the act of drawing 
attention to risks can have a distorting effect in relation to the relative seriousness of dramatic 
and mundane risks (Slovic 1986). Education may also contribute to an understanding of how 
risks can be managed (Twigg 2004). In addition, a more risk averse personality may seek 
more information about imagined risks and the information obtained may lead to a 
modification of attitudes, towards either a more relaxed or a more risk averse position. 
Owners may vary in their attitude to risk and in their perception of what creates and 
aggravates risk. Gilmore, Carson and O’Donnell (2004) found that business founders 
perceived cash flow risks to be particularly critical and that succession planning, delegation, 
diversification and business expansion were all risk factors. The individual’s perception of 
where risk lies is a key part of risk attitude. 
While risk attitude is a personal and subjective reality, risk appetite is a commercial 
and behavioural one. Risk attitude will influence risk appetite, with a risk averse person 
adopting a lower risk appetite in business matters. However risk appetite is also influenced by 
other things, including business vulnerability, that is, the level of adverse events which can be 
endured before the business fails. A certain level of vulnerability may be inherent in the 
business environment or be forced on the business owner by available business options. The 
more vulnerable the business in present circumstances, the less additional risk the business 
owner will be willing to take. Risk attitude and business vulnerability are therefore internal 
and external influences respectively acting on the business owner and affecting risk appetite. 
One factor affecting risk appetite is the reason for starting in business. Block and 
Sandner (2009) and Block, Sandner and Spiegel (2015) found that necessity entrepreneurs 
were more risk averse than opportunity entrepreneurs and the two types of entrepreneur may 
differ in both their pre-existing risk attitude and their experience of business risk, which may 
be of particular significance for developing countries, where there is a greater prevalence of 
necessity entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al 2001). Necessity entrepreneurs may also be 
motivated to close their own businesses and enter employment elsewhere when the 
opportunity arises (Ghosh and Guha 2015). This may be of particular relevance to 
microinsurance for small businesses in developing countries, because of the prevalence of 
necessity entrepreneurship there (Reynolds et al 2001). This may reduce the willingness of 
business owners to undertake business activities which involve higher personal or financial 
risks but in cases where they do undertake risky activities it may increase their likelihood of 
taking out insurance where it is available. 
A business owner with a lower risk appetite might avoid risks where possible, thereby 
reducing the need for insurance but might also have a greater propensity to insure for a given 
level of risk. Meanwhile, the specific risks faced by the business must be considered in the 
light of the circumstances in which the business operates, as it is this that creates vulnerability, 
the risk of business failure or other serious consequences. Vulnerability to risk is not wholly 
avoidable and, combined with a low risk appetite, creates a propensity to insure, which will 
lead to insurance being taken up if suitable insurance is available (Cohen, McCord and 
Sebstad, 2005). 
Risk Appetite and Propensity to Insure 
Beyond the nature of the risks themselves, the uptake of microinsurance is influenced 
both by personal factors affecting microbusiness owners, by availability of risk management 
tools to reduce the need for insurance and by availability of insurance if required. Risk 
appetite is one factor which may affect the willingness of business owners to engage in 
activities which increase risk and subsequently their likelihood of insuring against the risk if 
insurance is available. 
Risk management tools include use of information networks (Gilmore, Carson and 
O’Donnell 2004), use of experiential knowledge within core competencies (Gilmore, Carson 
and O’Donnell 2004), production of a formal business plan (Blackburn, Hart and Wainwright 
2013) and use of tried and tested technologies (Blackburn, Hart and Wainwright 2013). 
Risks and the Nature of Risk 
Microbusinesses exist in agriculture, fishing (Inda-Diaz et al 2009; Mmopelwa et al 
2009), manufacturing (Ghosh and Guha 2015) and retailing (Eversole 2004). Morduch (1994) 
identifies three structural sources that create vulnerability for the low income population 
likely to be engaged in microbusinesses in developing countries: 
a) Weather and price variability of crops for agricultural communities 
b) Poorly developed financial institutions 
c) Weak social insurance institutions weak 
These low income groups sometimes possess alternatives to the weak financial and 
insurance sector in that they may revert to self-insurance or informal insurance mechanisms 
such as borrowing from extended family or investing in assets with lower risk-adjusted 
returns such as jewellery and livestock (St. Bernard 2003; Miller et al 2006; Cook 2009). 
Remittances may also be used to compensate for natural disasters (Combes and Ebeke 2011), 
although reliance on remittances can create a further vulnerability in cases where relatives 
sending remittances are working in the informal economy or in legitimate but dangerous jobs 
(Powers, Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011). Therefore, shock events outcomes are stabilized 
by reduction of food stocks, sale of assets, calls for gifts from relatives and friends or local 
and family borrowing (Matul et al 2013). Matul, Tatin-Jaleran and Kelly (2011) provide an 
example of more permanent welfare sharing groups in Kenya, where members of the group 
contribute to a fund to provide payouts on the death of a family member and to contribute to 
healthcare costs. 
However the financially vulnerable often pay heavily for the chance to save as the 
cost of informal loans can be significant (Rutherford, 1999). These loans are generally used 
to cover the basic living requirements and savings and insurance are at lower end of the 
priority list. Availability of financial resources is one factor in determining the propensity to 
insure and the lack of resources to fund insurance and to provide for savings to fall back on 
increases business vulnerability (Dayson, Vik and Ward 2009). 
Small businesses and microbusinesses face, if anything, a wider range of critical risks 
than large multinationals. Because the microbusiness is more focused and uses a smaller 
range of resources, it is less able to absorb losses caused by local events or to diversify into 
industries with low or negative correlations of risk. 
Owner-managed businesses in particular are vulnerable to business interruptions 
occasioned by the death, injury or illness (Eversole 2004) of the owner or by the owner’s 
personal legal or financial troubles. 
Small businesses in any economy face risks associated with trading partner 
insolvencies (Gilmore, Carson and O’Donnell 2004), reliance on outsourced logistics firms 
(Li and Chen 2010). Value chain risks can affect all sizes of business (Pujawan and Geraldin 
2009). Smaller businesses, however, may be more vulnerable to the breakdown of links in the 
supply chain if they are not a major node in the business network and therefore have fewer 
alternative suppliers or customers. In addition, smaller businesses may face information 
asymmetries in their relationships with larger customers and suppliers and logistics firms (Li 
and Chen 2010), who may be better placed to exploit market information. 
Although the probability of economic crime by employees, customers and outsiders 
than for larger businesses (Broadhurst, Bouhours and Bouhours 2013), which are more 
lucrative and more sustainable targets for the criminal, small businesses are less well placed 
to recover from serious crime losses. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2014) 
found that the worldwide average loss from a single fraud at a business employing fewer than 
100 people was US$155 000 in 2014, which was more than the average loss for businesses 
employing 100 to 9999 people, with small enterprises being vulnerable to cheque tampering 
and financial statement fraud, as a result of the use of less sophisticated payment channels 
and inadequate resources for internal operational and financial reporting controls (Gunduz 
and Önder 2013). Small businesses may also suffer as a result of economic crimes involving 
corruption (Ionescu 2009; Mushkat and Mushkat 2012; Coogan et al 2015) and targeting big 
business and government (Ksenia 2008), which can deprive small businesses of access to 
adequate infrastructure (Tsaturyan and Bryson 2009), communications (Sutherland 2015) and 
healthcare (Hunt 2010) or divert labour and economic resources into illegitimate business (de 
Andrade 2008). In addition, small businesses may be more direct victims of corruption in 
cases where they are either approached for a bribe or excluded from contracts by recipients of 
bribes from other businesses (Luo and Han 2009). This risk is essentially uninsurable. 
A further uninsurable risk arises from microbusinesses conducting their business 
informally (Srivastava and Shaw 2014; Ghosh and Guha 2015) or illegally by, for example, 
operating as an unlicensed street trader (Eversole 2004), which presents the risk of temporary 
or permanent closure, as well as exposing the business to both risks and opportunities arising 
from corruption and from political lobbying either to shut down or to legitimate illegal traders. 
Working in an unlicensed business also presents difficulties in obtaining insurance or other 
assistance, leaving these businesses particularly vulnerable to disasters and adverse events 
(Srivastava and Shaw 2014). 
Handley-Schachler and Navare (2010) propose a scheme for categorising risk 
according to seven variables: cause; location of control; people affected; nature of effect; 
location of the effects; frequency; degree of effects; degree of symmetry; and predictability. 
This taxonomy was developed for the wider social impact of risks relating to transport and 
requires modification in the discussion of insurance for microbusinesses. The question of the 
people affected is less relevant here, even if third party insurance is involved, as the only 
relevant risks are those which have an impact on the business itself. Externalities are 
essentially beyond the scope of microinsurance except to the extent that the insured business 
can be made liable for costs arising from them. The nature of the effect is also of little interest 
in the case of microinsurance. While illness and injury to owners or employees and damage 
to property are potential risks, the only effects relevant to the continuation of the business are 
those which ultimately have a measurable financial effect, even if the immediate effects relate 
to personal illness, injury or property damage. The location of the effects is likewise 
irrelevant, as only those risks which have an effect on the business at its place of operations 
are relevant, even if the risks are caused by events in other places. Finally symmetry is not 
relevant to insured risks, as only the downside probabilities are taken into account in the 
insurance contract and the upside probabilities are irrelevant. 
However there are two further variables which are of greater importance in the 
microinsurance contract: information asymmetry (Chiappori 2000) and correlation or 
covariance with other policyholders’ risks (Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999; Alwang, Siegel 
and Jorgensen 2001; Dercon et al 2008). We therefore propose that insurable risks for 
microbusinesses may be categorized by seven variables: 
1. Cause 
2. Location of control 
3. Frequency 
4. Degree of effects 
5. Predictability 
6. Information asymmetry 
7. Policyholder cross-correlation 
Some of causes of risk are more significant to microbusinesses than to larger 
businesses. The risk of death or illness to key personnel, especially owners who provide both 
capital and labour to the business are more serious for businesses where there are limited 
opportunities to replace these personnel. Apart from the risk of business closure, the death of 
the owner of an unincorporated business and inheritance of the business assets by an heir who 
regards the business as a going concern but is unwilling or unable to manage it creates agency 
and tenancy problems where the manager of the business or leaseholder of the business 
premises has interests which are no longer aligned with the new business owner or landlord. 
Causes of risk vary between different types of microbusiness. Small rural businesses 
might be threatened by adverse weather conditions or plant or livestock diseases but poorer 
farmers may also be based on marginal land in areas prone to flooding or earthquakes, while 
urban businesses are likely to be based in areas which have been preselected for habitation 
because of their relative safety from natural disasters. Subsistence and small scale 
commercial fishers may be threatened by pollution and overfishing (Inda-Diaz et al 2009) 
and by poisoning related to their occupation (Mathee et al 2013). In the case of risks of 
disease and crime, densely populated urban areas may be subject to greater threats from 
organized crime and epidemics but rural areas may have lower levels of policing and poorer 
access to health services. 
In addition, while some microbusinesses may have only one employee, others may 
employ family members or other staff. This presents labour market risks of competition from 
other employers and also risks of industrial disputes. Ghosh and Guha (2015) found that even 
employing family members reduced microbusiness profit margins in Mumbai slums 
compared with businesses with no employees beyond the business owner. Eversole (2004, 
p.134) provides an example of one microbusiness owner who had already been forced to 
close one business because of high rents and poor industrial relations and who no longer 
employed any non-family-members in her second business. Industrial disputes are not usually 
insurable from the employer’s side. In addition, microbusiness owners may be at risk of 
violence or appropriation of earnings by domestic partners (Banthia et al 2012; Green et al 
2015). 
Weather risks also affect different businesses to different degrees. Unusual weather 
conditions may affect the yields for an agricultural business for an entire year or necessitate 
the replacement of livestock. For construction and transport businesses business interruptions 
directly caused by weather conditions will be more temporary. Retailing businesses may not 
be directly affected at all. 
The layers of sources of risk for microbusinesses are shown in Figure 2, with 
expanding layers representing the owner, the workforce (who may also be the household), 
local geography – both human, including urban development and depopulation of rural areas, 
and physical, including weather risks and natural disasters, and regional geography over a 
wide area. 
Figure 2. Sources of Risk to Microbusinesses 
________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
_________________________ 
The location of control of risk is especially important in insurance, as the insurance 
of risks which are controllable by the business owner creates moral hazard. 
Frequency relates to how often the event may be expected to occur for the business in 
question and, together with the degree of effects is commonly used in risk heat mapping to 
identify risks on which the business should focus its risk management and insurance 
strategies (see, for example, Collopy 2015). 
In the context of insurance, however, frequency of the event may also affect the take-
up of insurance, as potential policyholders will have less experience of either the likely 
effects or the actual frequency of infrequent events (Giesbert and Steiner 2015). 
The degree of effects depends on hazard impact and vulnerability (Kaplan and 
Garrick 1981; Alexander 1993; Wisner et al 2003), being a function both of the initial impact 
of the event and also of the ability of the individual, household or business to absorb the 
impact. Vulnerability depends on social and economic factors and the likely process of 
managing risk (Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen 2001) as well as the nature of the event. 
Cardona (2001) analyses earthquake risks in relation to socio-economic structures which 
affect the outcome for those affected and which need to be considered in assessing the 
vulnerability of any person or enterprise exposed to any particular risk. The degree of effects 
can therefore be seen as a function of both the hazard (conditional value at risk Jorion 2010) 
and vulnerability as a result of an event and vulnerability, which is the difficulty of mitigating 
the loss. The relationship between risk, adaptability and vulnerability is illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Risk and Vulnerability 
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
____________________ 
Vulnerability may be greater for those who are not socialized as part of an affinity 
group with access to common resources or effective risk sharing structures, which may 
increase vulnerability for isolated migrants or those left behind by migration. 
Predictability is low for wide range of natural disasters, such as tsunamis and 
earthquakes. It is also a difficulty in weather based insurances for agricultural products, as the 
actual business risk is not purely a function of the weather. Weather conditions affect 
business success in agricultural microbusinesses (Pelka, Musshoff and Weber 2015). 
However low crop yields as a result of poor weather conditions are partly offset by higher 
prices if the market is purely local or the poor conditions are widespread. Prediction of the 
losses incurred due to poor weather is dependent not only on the prediction of the weather but 
also on the prediction of the relationship between weather and crop yields and on the 
relationship between crop yield, prices and demand, which depends on factors such as price 
elasticity of demand, external competition and substitutability. From the economic point of 
view, the risk of overproduction as a result of good weather conditions in a market with 
inelastic demand, resulting in lower prices and higher selling and distribution costs, may be 
as serious as the risk of underproduction as a result of poor weather conditions. The risk of 
overproduction, however, is not insurable. For larger businesses it might be managed through 
options contracts but the commercial infrastructure may not be in place to make these 
available to small farmers. 
Information asymmetry is a key issue for microbusinesses seeking insurance. It is in 
part related to predictability, as the relevant information available to one party must relate to 
the prediction of future events. It is not, however, the same things as predictability, as it 
relates to the distribution of relevant information needed to form predictions and not to the 
theoretical possibility of forming such predictions with perfect information. 
Weather based insurance, while easy to understand presents significant problems of 
information asymmetry, as the insurance provider usually has better access to long term 
weather forecasts than the insured business owner (Clarke and Grenham 2013). 
Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs) or Mutual Guarantee Associations (MGAs) 
may help to reduce information asymmetry between major financial institutions and 
microbusinesses (de Gobbi 2003; Gai and Ielasi 2014). MGIs are not insurance institutions 
but involvement in an MGI might provide microbusinesses with a conduit for information on 
economic risks and events. 
Information asymmetry need not always mean that the insurance provider has more 
information than the prospective policyholder. Ito and Kono (2010) found that households in 
India with sick family members were more likely to take up health insurance, except where 
the head of household was sick, where lack resources made health insurance less affordable. 
Dalal (2015) also reports the case of Swayam Shikshan Prayog in India where both adverse 
selection and greater propensity to use health services after taking out insurance led to 
unexpectedly high claims and ultimately to the termination of the scheme. A lack of ability of 
the insurer to assess risks and monitor policy holder behaviour may serve as a barrier to the 
availability of insurance (Gai and Ielasi 2014). This problem may be mitigated by 
information flows through MGIs. 
Policyholder cross-correlation may affect insurers’ solvency (Radermacher and 
Brinkmann 2011) and known widespread cross-correlations may therefore reduce trust in 
insurers. Njuguna and Arunga (2013) explain risk correlation or covariance as occurring 
when a significant cross-section of policyholders suffer economic loss from the same risk. 
Local disasters may also make business continuity impossible because of the loss of 
customers or employees, thereby making insurance payouts insufficient to restart in business. 
The wider the scope of the source of risk, as shown in Figure 1, the greater the cross-
correlation between policyholders is likely to be. Policyholders in the same line of business 
may also have highly cross-correlated risks, possibly making those MGIs which are based on 
business types (de Gobbi 2003) less attractive vehicles for advertising or organising insurance. 
High correlation of insured risks may occur in cases where the insurer pays out on the 
basis of a general set of conditions, such as a rainfall index (Clarke and Grenham 2013) 
rather than on the basis of specific loss to the insured person, although the insurer may be 
better able than the small policyholder to offset these risks by means of commodity price 
derivatives. The insurer may, however, still be unable to meet heavy local losses without 
adequate diversification in other markets or may find that a particular local scheme has 
become too risky and cease to offer it, as happened in the case of Fonkoze’s catastrophe 
based insurance in Haiti after repeated hurricane losses (Dalal 2015). 
Education 
Giné and Yang (2008) and Koloma (2015), found that better educated farmers were 
also more likely to take up insurance, while Akter et al (2011) found a similar correlation for 
households generally. Education may be a key factor affecting microinsurance take-up, as in 
some places microbusiness owners may tend to be uneducated or illiterate (Ghosh and Guha 
2015). Giesbert and Steiner (2015) also found that many uneducated people said themselves 
that their lack of education and information made it more difficult to understand insurance 
policies. Giesbert and Steiner’s findings also suggest that there may also be a tendency for 
some policyholders with a low level of education to regard insurance as more of a savings 
scheme than as a contribution to a mutual fund for disaster recovery. There may also be an 
interaction between education and necessity entrepreneurship, as educated necessity 
entrepreneurs in developed countries have been found to make lower returns on their 
education than either opportunity entrepreneurs or employees (Fossen and Büttner 2013) and 
this may lead to an enhanced motivation for educated microbusiness owners to exit business 
ownership and enter other employment, making the microbusiness more transitional and 
thereby reducing the value of insurance and the probability of even educated business owners 
taking out insurance. 
Financial position 
Block, Sandner and Spiegel (2015) found that entrepreneurs who have substantial 
personal assets may be better placed to survive adverse events than business owners with 
more modest assets. It is unlikely that business owners have no assets at all, which would 
mean that there could be no risk of losses. Therefore, it may be anticipated that less wealthy 
business owners would always be less able to continue in business after sustaining losses and 
would therefore be more risk averse. However Giné and Yang (2008) found that wealthier 
farmers and those with higher incomes were more likely to take up insurance. This may not, 
however, indicate greater risk aversion but merely greater resources to purchase insurance, 
especially as Ito and Kono (2010) found that families with sick heads of households and 
therefore with poorer financial resources were less likely but households with other sick 
members more likely to take out health insurance. Women may also fail to obtain health 
insurance either because of household decisions or because of a reluctance on the part of 
insurers to insure pregnant women (Ahmed and Ramm 2006; Banthia et al 2012). 
Morduch (1994) also considers the differences in poverty, in the sense that poverty 
can be either chronic or transitory. Chronic poverty means that the people are constantly in a 
state of poverty and have few mechanisms to lift themselves out of this. Transitory poverty is 
the ‘failure to find protection against stochastic elements in the environment’ (Morduch 
1994). This would be where the household suffers a shock that significantly reduces earnings, 
for example, the bread winner falling sick. If insurance mechanisms can be put into place 
here they may mitigate these shocks but irregular incomes can make it more difficult to pay 
insurance premiums which only provide cover against the specific risks insured. The 
prevalence of income vulnerability makes it difficult to save and invest in insurance or other 
risk mitigation vehicles. 
Financial Risk Aggregation and Microinsurance 
The concept of risk mitigation goes far beyond the simple role of insurance of 
identified perils. It extends to a discipline that focuses on the complex mix of risk and 
uncertainty. Most of the global concern about risks and uncertainties has tended to focus on 
the three ‘F’s food, financial and fuel (Addison, Arndt and Tarp 2011; Ravallion and Chen 
2009). However as Bannerjee and Duflo (2011) observe, these concerns may make little 
difference to the overall risk that the low income and economically deprived have to deal 
with. These groups are more vulnerable to shocks as they are more vulnerable to general risks 
such as poverty, illness and insufficiency (Cohen, McCord and Sebstad 2005; Chantarat et al 
2013; Collins et al 2009). 
Governments of developing countries do not have effective economic structures to 
protect people on low incomes. Much of this group are employed in the informal sectors 
where there is greater wage vulnerability (International Labour Organization 2010). 
The Provision of Microinsurance  
The take-up of insurance depends not only on potential demand but also on potential 
supply, with the availability, understandability and quality of suitable insurance policies 
being crucial to the customer’s decision to insure (see in general Churchill 2006; Churchill 
and Matul 2012). The concept of insurance is one of financial risk transfer. The basis of 
insurance requires two key premises a) the law of large numbers and b) negligent adverse 
selection. 
The law of large numbers suggests that the larger the number of mutually independent 
risks in a risk pool, the lower the variance of mean losses (Berliner, 1982). In other words the 
existence of a large group of policyholders being covered for similar and disparate risks helps 
dilute the risk for the insurance company and also enables the charging of more modest 
premiums. The portfolio of policyholders assumes that here is a normal distribution in the 
risk profile of the policyholders with little or no cross-correlation. If all policyholders are 
high risk, that increases the risk exposure of the company portfolio. This creates a situation of 
adverse selection and if the premium does not reflect this higher risk, the insurance company 
can find itself not only having a high risk exposure but also potentially exposed to high moral 
hazard (Stiglitz 1990; Varian 1990; Wydick, 1999), where policy holders may take less care 
of their property, crops or livestock once it is insured or even intentionally seek to claim 
when the grounds for the claim do not exist, for example, naming non-existent persons as 
policyholders in a group insurance scheme and claiming against these names. In addition, 
honest and diligent policyholders may be less likely to take out insurance if they do not have 
trust the solvency of the insurer and the need for insurer solvency may contribute to the 
development of expensive and poor quality insurance policies (Clarke 2011), while high risk 
groups may be keen to take out insurance or high risk individuals may even deliberately form 
groups for group insurance policy purposes, thereby contributing to the collapse of the 
insurance scheme (Radermacher, Dror and Noble 2006). 
Microinsurers may be able to protect themselves to some extent against claims arising 
from reckless behaviour by participation in public health and loss prevention programmes 
(Qureshi and Noble 2006), although these may be costly and could create a free rider effect 
whereby purchase of insurance is not a prerequisite for benefiting from schemes which cost 
the insurer money. 
In addition to the issue of the level of financial education among the insured 
community, the insurance agents and managers for some microinsurance schemes may 
themselves lack sophisticated risk assessment and management skills (Garand and Wipf 
2006), leading to mispricing of policies and solvency risks. 
Microinsurance, although a novel scheme (Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer and Peppiatt 
2006), is subject to more adverse selection and high moral hazard if not properly evaluated. 
Before considering the additional risks, we look at the models of microinsurance. 
Because the low premiums which most microbusiness owners in developing countries 
can afford and the potentially high cost of verifying and paying claims in remote areas, the 
marginal surplus per policy for microinsurers is likely to be low. This can reduce the 
attractiveness of microinsurance for commercial companies and make co-operative schemes 
less sustainable (Weilant 2015). The attractiveness of microinsurance schemes for insurers 
can, however, be improved by increasing both the number of policyholders and the 
proportion of repeat business, which reduces administrative costs. 
Cohen and McCord (2003) highlight four institutional models for providing 
microinsurance, particularly for fundamental risks. 
Community-based model where local communities, microfinance institutions and 
NGOs and relevant co-operatives develop a mutually funded pool to deal with these risks 
(Fonteneau and Galland 2006). In some instances these risks can be reinsured in the 
commercial market especial where the pools are significantly large (as with the Proshika fund 
in Bangladesh). 
Full service model: Commercial insurers provide the normal range of insurance 
services. Although this requires simplification and large number of policyholders. For 
example, BancoSol in Bolivia offers health micro insurance through the underwriting offices 
of Zurich Insurance for less than $5 per month. The policy is simple and no medical 
examination is required. 
Provider model: Banks and other providers of microfinance can directly offer or 
require insurance contracts. These are usually coupled with credit, for example, to insure 
against default risk. The Economist (2005) in its Microfinance Survey put it, ‘one of the most 
encouraging trends in microfinance is that the world’s largest banks and insurers are 
becoming interested.’ Banks are also moving into micro insurance. For example they either 
offer microfinance through the medium of mutual benefit organizations or are used as a 
distribution channel as in Panama. In some cases, microinsurance may be provided as part of 
a microfinance loan deal, reducing administrative costs (McCord, Buczkowski and Saksena 
2006). 
Partner-agent model: Commercial or public insurers together with microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) collaboratively develop the 
product (McCord 2006). The insurer absorbs the risk and the MFI/NGO markets the product 
through its established distribution network. This lowers the cost of distribution and thus 
promotes affordability. 
Recently the growth of mobile technology has seen the growth of mobile providers 
making available micro insurance and finance. And recently the growth of mobile 
technology has seen the growth of mobile providers providing micro insurance and finance. 
For example, an innovation developed in Kenya by insurance company Union Insurance and 
Provincial Insurance (UAP) Group, in partnership with seed producers and fertilizer and 
chemical manufacturers, is the offer of Kilimo Salama, an index based weather insurance 
policy, with premiums being collected and claims settled using the online M-Pesa system. 
Farmers pay a 5% premium when they make their purchases  and if there is a drought or 
excessive rain during the growing season they automatically receives a payout up to the limit 
agreed to their M-Pesa account on their phone. 
However the provision of micro insurance does not necessarily alleviate financial 
aggregation in fact many of the micro businesses may find it difficult to save to pay even a 
basic premium and the level of cover may be low at best. This may create a drag effect in 
encouraging profitable outcomes. 
MGAs or MGIs, which enable microbusinesses to access finance from banks (de 
Gobbi 2003) are not insurance vehicles but a system for protecting the providers of finance 
from risks arising from business failures, which may be caused by market conditions, 
government regulation or other factors. Here there is a need for risk assessment, either by the 
financial institutions providing loans or by the MGA itself. There is also the possibility of 
moral hazard, with weaker businesses accessing finance on the basis of guarantees provided 
by stronger businesses. There is a further difficulty in the case of MGAs which consist of 
members from a single industry or a single locality, leading to a high cross-correlation of 
risks of insolvency. 
Secondly, in many instances there is financial exclusion preventing certain 
entrepreneurs from accessing banking facilities to enable investments and savings. The 
accelerating mobile technology, seemingly plays a significant role in mitigating this 
circumstance. However sporadic or intermittent local knowledge on the part of the insurer 
can also present difficulties for claims handling, prompt payment of genuine claims and 
detection of fraudulent claims, which can result in reduced policy effectiveness for genuine 
claimants and increased costs for both policyholders and insurers (Radermacher and 
Brinkmann 2011). Claims processing can also be delayed by inadequate administrative 
resources (McCord and Leftley 2006) and people who have taken out insurance policies may 
fail to make a claim when an insured event occurs (Churchill and Cohen 2006). 
Problems for Microinsurance 
Apart from high moral hazard and adverse selection, there are additional risks faced 
by providers such as cross-correlated risks, undersized risk pools (Jütting 2004; Biener and 
Eling 2011), cost of transactions (Lineerooth–Bayer et al 2009); and lack of effective data 
(Levin and Reinhard 2007), creating problems of stochasticity and making quantification of 
loss probabilities difficult. The use of compulsory insurance for microfinance borrowers or of 
basket insurance policies which bundle different types of insurance together can help to 
reduce adverse selection but can result in policyholders being manoeuvred into taking out 
insurance that they do not want or need (Wipf, Liber and Churchill 2006). 
Another problem is the growing agglomeration risk arising out of policyholders 
belonging to an affinity group, for example by being members of a co-operative. Membership 
of some affinity groups may provide more continuity for insurance providers and be an 
indication of better and more manageable risks, leading to the offer of incentives to take on 
insurance. This may affect outsiders, including vulnerable rural and urban households that 
may seek insurance but may have to do so at a higher price. 
Affinity groups can be exclusive in a sense that certain groups defined by gender, 
caste or tribe  may be excluded from privileges offered to those within the group, leading to 
enhanced vulnerability for those excluded (Fernandes 2007). Affinity groupings are 
important for microinsurers, as the costs of distribution are lower and this can impact pricing 
(Koven et al 2012). There is no clear evidence that targeted affinity groups do obtain better 
insurance rates (Koven, Chandani and Garand 2013) or even better understanding of the 
products. Koven Chandani and Garand (2013) also observed that not all affinity groups 
involved in insurance intermediation were effective in enabling consistency in premium 
collection, collectives did improve consistency. 
The high vulnerability of persons who are not socially protected by membership of an 
affinity group may be aggravated by a lack of access to low cost insurance and by problems 
which exist for insurance providers. Firstly, the non-affinity-group portfolio may be affected 
by adverse selection if those who seek insurance are in higher risk categories, while affinity 
groups which have a propensity to insure may present portfolios of high, medium and low 
risk policyholders. Secondly, populations which do not identify with strong affinity groups 
may be mobile and transient, making collection of premiums and renewal of policies difficult 
and expensive to administer. Thirdly, mobility can make the prediction of risk types and 
probabilities difficult for both insurers and the insured. 
Because microinsurance tends to be seen as a social service rather than as a mainly 
profit-motivated business, microinsurance providers often receive low premiums and they are 
faced with the need to provide even higher quality insurance than might be provided in fully 
profit based insurance markets, as the ability to expedite claims, the avoidance of exclusions 
and the range of cover are especially valuable for vulnerable groups. 
Microinsurance and Risk Aversion 
Underinsurance leads to suboptimal decision making and foregone income (Carter et 
al 2007). Elabed and Carter (2013) examined the relationship between behavioural 
constraints and acquisition of microinsurance. They considered indexed insurance (a 
relatively new approach), where payments are based on a derived index (e.g. level of rainfall) 
correlated to individual losses such as loss of assets or working capital. Index insurance does 
not require claims assessment and therefore enables claims settlement processes to be quicker 
and more objective. It also reduces adverse selection and moral hazard. Elabed and Carter’s 
(2013) research demonstrated that where there was greater compound risk aversion (where 
one risk creates a series of other related risks) over certain outcomes, there was a lesser 
willingness to pay for insurance. This was because of the way insurance was valued. 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) in their research observed that in poorer areas there 
was both an overvaluation of outcomes and under valuation of insurance as it involved a 
premium payment and hence the willingness to pay related to the potential that might be 
received in claim amounts. Therefore farmers might be have a compounded risk aversion in 
bad years where they see the premium payments might be seen as a problem more than the 
potential for systemic risks. As a result this entails financial aggregation (a compounding 
effect). 
Factors affecting vulnerability and ability to insure are briefly summarized in Table 2. 
High vulnerability and low ability to insure lead to a high risks of irrecoverable business 
failure as a result of potential aggregate risks, which may include risks which are highly 
correlated, such as the loss of business assets, environmental damage and dispersal of the 
local community in the case of natural disasters or civil unrest. 
Table 2. Vulnerability and Ability to Insure 
____________________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
____________________ 
Discussion 
The core purpose of this study is to explore the factors which affect the take-up of 
microinsurance by micro and small businesses in developing countries and the impact on the 
levels of financial aggregation. 
On the demand side, the interaction between business circumstances and risk creates 
vulnerability to risk. There are also a variety of factors which can affect the business owner’s 
risk appetite, including the reasons for starting in business and experience in business. A 
necessity entrepreneur is likely to be more risk averse than an opportunity entrepreneur and 
may also have less in the way of alternative resources to avoid extreme poverty in the event 
of a business failure. Personal financial resources and business assets can also both contribute 
to the ability to continue in business after a shock and therefore allow a less risk averse 
approach. 
Personal risk averseness can contribute to the propensity to insure in two ways. An 
unwillingness to engage in risky business activities can reduce the range and level of risks 
which require insurance. However a risk averse attitude may also create a propensity to 
insure at lower levels of risk, with more risk averse entrepreneurs being more inclined to 
insure against less probable events and more willing to pay higher premiums to limit losses. 
While vulnerability can increase the need for insurance, vulnerability resulting from a 
poor present financial situation can also make it more difficult for the business owner to find 
the money to pay insurance premium, as is particularly illustrated by the low take-up of 
health insurance where the head of household is ill, especially compared with the high take-
up in cases where other household members are ill. There may therefore sometimes be a 
negative relationship between the need for insurance and the demand for insurance as 
expenditure more immediately necessary to survival is given a higher priority. 
Education also affects the demand for insurance, as less well educated people may 
feel unable to understand insurance contracts and this may contribute to a reluctance to insure. 
It may also make it more difficult for less well educated people to take out appropriate 
insurance or to make inquiries about available insurance schemes. Less educated 
entrepreneurs may also perceive insurance as a savings scheme, rather than a scheme to 
aggregate and distribute financial risks, which will have an effect on their propensity to 
insure, as a profitable insurance scheme cannot offer policyholders value for money as a 
substitute for savings and investments. It is therefore unlikely that anybody who compares 
insurance outcomes with savings outcomes will be attracted to any sustainable insurance 
scheme. This can make microinsurance commercially unviable from the outset. However 
there may be opportunities for microinsurers to develop or support education schemes to 
increase knowledge of risk, risk management and insurance among people in their target 
market (Dror, Dalal and Matul 2012). Education programmes could include the use of 
broadcast mass media and cinema (Bel and Caicedo 2013), as well as more targeted 
classroom seminar approaches. 
In addition, less well educated and less experienced entrepreneurs may have a less 
developed understanding of the risks which the business faces, leading to underinsurance of 
the risks to which they are most exposed. Even the more educated and more experienced may 
still face problems with information asymmetry, where insurance providers may increase the 
cost of insurance for risks which have become greater or even withdrawing from insurance 
provision altogether. Moreover, small business owners may lack information about the 
company or other institution offering the insurance and have insufficient reasons to believe in 
the trustworthiness or solvency of the scheme or the efficiency of claims settlement 
(Churchill and Cohen 2006). 
The relationship between education and insurance may affect the long term continuity 
of insurance schemes as necessity entrepreneurs with a high level of education may also be 
making a low return on their education and seek opportunities to enter alternative 
employment, instead of continuing to be self-employed. In order to reduce administrative and 
marketing costs and offer value for money to policyholders, a sustainable insurance scheme 
must rely on a high level of repeat business, especially in cases where potential policyholders 
are difficult to contact and are unfamiliar with insurance. Financial education, including an 
understanding of how insurance works, is therefore likely to increase the reach of insurance 
schemes. 
It is clear that hazard perception and level of risk aversion are based on the perception 
and valuation of risk. The undervaluation or overvaluation of the benefits of risk insurance 
payments can influence microinsurance take up and vitiate financial aggregation, although it 
is clear that the undervaluation of insurance can overtake the overvaluation and can result in 
MSMEs not taking up insurance when they need it most. 
On the supply side, a great many risks faced by microbusiness owners are unattractive 
to insurers or essentially uninsurable. Microbusinesses may face threats from corruption, 
which may reduce the availability of essential government and private sector services or 
reduce access to markets in which corruption is present. Microbusinesses can also be 
vulnerable to the effects of other crimes, such as disregard for building regulations, which can 
also have the effect of nullifying relevant insurance policies. There may be other uninsurable 
risks arising from domestic disputes and domestic violence, which may be largely beyond the 
scope of the business itself but still seriously affect business performance and continuity. 
Disputes with employees and industrial action, which microbusiness owners are less able to 
absorb than larger concerns, are also largely uninsurable and smaller employers’ negotiating 
power will be severely reduced in cases where labour is unionized and alternative 
employment is available. 
Insurance may also be unavailable in the case of natural and widespread disasters and, 
even if it is available, insurance payouts are unlikely to be sufficient to restore the position of 
the business before the disaster, as customers, employees and business partners are also likely 
to be affected. These risks may be especially serious for business owners who have been 
forced to occupy marginal rural land which is prone to flooding or poor weather conditions. 
Given the barriers to the development of demand for microinsurance, it is not 
surprising that microinsurance has tended not to be viewed as a commercially viable profit-
making business. Some commercial insurance exists within the full service model, where 
simplified insurance policies are offered with reduced customer screening, and the provider 
model, where insurance is offered as part of a microfinance deal. In other cases, 
microinsurance is offered on the community-based model or the partner-agent model, with 
involvement from non-commercial institutions, with a view to providing a public service and 
increasing sustainability. Lack of access to insurance can be a major barrier to economic 
development, as the lack of available insurance may discourage business start-ups and 
increase the rate of business failures when adverse events occur. Initiatives to improve access 
to insurance can therefore contribute to sustainable development. However these initiatives 
may be subject to problems of moral hazard as well as high administrative costs. In addition, 
schemes which focus on particular localities or affinity groups may be affected by 
policyholder risk cross-correlations which could threaten the solvency of the provider and 
undermine trust in the system. It may also be far more time-consuming and expensive to 
gather market data and risk assessment information for remote and rural areas, making the 
provision of appropriate microinsurance for small farmers all the more difficult. 
Conclusion 
This paper makes two contributions. Firstly, it develops a conceptual paradigm for the 
analysis of the relationship between vulnerability and risk appetite among micro, small and 
medium sized business owners in developing countries, perceptions of insurance and 
propensity to insure. Secondly it examines these relationships in the light of the existing 
literature on risk, microbusiness and microinsurance and explores how the demand for and 
supply of microinsurance for small businesses in developing countries impacts the 
microinsurance market. 
The need for insurance arises not merely from the risk of an event occurring but from 
the vulnerability of the business and its owner to the risk involved. Vulnerability is a function 
not only of the controllability, frequency and severity of the risk but also of the circumstances 
of the business itself. However businesses with poorer financial resources, which are 
consequently more vulnerable to events, are also less able to pay insurance premiums. 
In addition to the need for insurance, demand for insurance is also driven by 
education, the availability of effective information and the degree of correlation and 
covariance of risks. Microbusinesses and their insurers may both face information 
asymmetries in relation to the risks involved and in relation to the ability of the insurer to 
meet claims when they are made. These information asymmetries can to a certain extent be 
mitigated by using communal information channels, such as those provided by MGIs but the 
cost of information is likely to be a further factor in reducing the commercial viability of 
microinsurance. 
Commercial provision of microinsurance is limited by the costs involved and the 
unreliability of repeat business, leaving a need for government or not-for-profit NGO 
involvement. Insurance contracts may also be simplified to reduce costs, leading to limited 
risk screening and adverse selection, as well as potentially poor-value policies which do not 
directly cover the essential risks. 
The take up of microinsurance can be improved by better education and the 
development of improved information channels for both policyholders and providers, as well 
as government and other outside funding to subsidize schemes which contribute to long-run 
sustainable development. 
Conceptual Model Implications and Future Research 
This conceptually based paper is subject to the limitation that it lacks new empirical 
evidence and further fieldwork would be welcome to establish the relationship between 
microinsurance and business survival and the effects of efforts to educate business owners in 
finance and insurance. Further empirical research on the relationship between risk aversion 
and insurance among microbusiness owners in urban and rural areas of less developed 
countries, controlling for business vulnerability and membership of different affinity groups 
would also be beneficial. 
The conceptual model highlights the importance of education in determining risk 
attitudes. This suggests the need for further research on the relationships between education 
and personal risk attitudes among microbusiness owners and other people in developing 
countries and the relationships between personal risk attitudes, business vulnerability and risk 
appetite. Research on the effectiveness of risk education and on the extent to which risk 
education may distort perceptions of the probability and effects of dramatic or uncontrollable 
risks for populations in developing countries is also desirable. 
The conceptual model manifests the link between risk appetite and business 
vulnerability and the need for more research on risk appetite among microbusiness owners 
and especially the relationship between business vulnerability and risk appetite. While a 
relationship between necessity entrepreneurship and risk aversion has already been 
established in the literature, further indicators of business vulnerability could be used in 
future research as part of efforts to generate a fuller picture of the determinants of risk 
appetite. 
Further research can also be conducted on microinsurers’ perceptions of risk 
covariance, moral hazard, adverse selection and distribution and administration issues which 
may affect their willingness to offer insurance. This research should focus as much on the 
insurers’ perceptions and reactions as on the underlying realities, as employees and agents of 
insurance companies also work within the limitations of their education, knowledge and 
ability to process information and will be no more able to take perfect decisions based on 
perfect information than potential policyholders. Systematic studies on information 
asymmetries between insurers and policyholders would also be worthwhile and, once again, 
studies should examine perceived as well as real information asymmetries, given the 
impossibility of different stakeholders having accurate impressions of the extent of each 
other’s knowledge and the likelihood of perceived information asymmetries being a barrier to 
trust in the market. 
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